Fire-ravaged FR Tower lacked fire emergency plan, says IEB

The design of the fire-ravaged FR Tower in Dhaka's Banani failed to provide a fire emergency plan, the Institution of Engineers, Bangladesh, (IEB) has said.

Also, the occupiers of different floors altered the layout of these floors to fit their own needs, leading to a higher death toll in the fire incident, they observed.

A nine-strong probe panel formed by IEB with its former president Engineer Nurul Huda in the lead made the findings in a report following a visit to the building on April 1.

“It is evident that the building design does not address fire safety measures. The position of the emergency fire escape stairs is totally wrong. Generally, the fire escape stairs are parallel with the general stairs in a building,” the IEB said in its report on the incident. 

“Therefore, the emergency exit became unusable when the general staircase and the corridor was filled with smoke. There was no point of having such an escape route.”

Also, on different floors, the entrance to the fire escape stairs was placed at a ‘prayer place’ or ‘dining place for the high-ups’ while in other places, it was locked.

There was no measure to keep the emergency exit smoke-free. Rather, it became unsafe as several cable lines were fixed inside the walls, the IEB found. 

People could have saved their lives even if the emergency stairs, with all its flaws, were accessible, the engineers said.

“But many people were unaware of the existence of an emergency exit stairs in the building. There was no emergency exit sign to direct the people to it.”

On March 28, a deadly fire engulfed the 23-storey FR Tower in Kamal Ataturk Avenue in Banani killing 26 persons and injuring more than 50. The Rupayan Group constructed the 23 storey building  in 2005 with approval of only 18 floors, said Rajdhani Unnayan Kartipakkha or RAJUK.

Police arrested BNP leader Tasvir Ul Islam, owner of the illegal floors  on the top and also SMHI Farook, the land owner in a case filed over the incident.

The IEB engineers explained the reasons behind the initiation and spread of the fire and called for the speedy implementation of its recommendations.

They described the FR Tower fire as a ‘wake-up call’, adding that there are hundreds of similar buildings which are at risk of fire, both in Dhaka and outside. All of these buildings should be evaluated for the risk of fire and measure taken to prevent fire hazards.

The FR Tower had fire extinguishers of ‘insufficient’ height, kept between two floors, said the IEB report.

“Glass panes were used for decoration. It was not easily breakable. Also, the gap from the next building was less than two feet.”

Occupiers of each floor or the owner altered the floor plans, said the report.

“Kitchens or walls separating toilets are in different spots at each floor. For example, the office room on the eighth floor is in the space allocated for a toilet or a kitchen. Therefore, the fire spread out in the ninth floor as the PVC pipe inside the ceiling of the eighth floor melted.”

The fire in FR Tower started at a room between the kitchen and the middle room on the north-east corner of the eighth floor, according to the IEB. 

“The small room had an air-conditioner, electric short circuit cables, chairs, tables and a yarn to make fabric. There was a gas burner in the kitchen next to the room. Therefore, a gas leakage, the electric cable or air-conditioner could have sparked the fire,” the report said.

There was not enough natural ventilation on most floors while the building also lacked fire prevention walls which may have caused the fire to spread, said the IEB.

“The eighth floor was filled with smoke quite quickly. That compelled everyone to exit the building in an emergency. "

"However, they probably left the entrance to the eighth floor open, making the staircase the only way for the smoke to escape and thus preventing the people on the upper floors from using the stairs."

It continued: “Even the people from ninth and tenth floor could not use the stairs. Around 30 persons could escape after they broke the glass pane on the tenth floor toilet and then cut the grills of the next building. Most of the 26 casualties died due to a lack of oxygen and the circulation of poisonous smoke.”

There was not enough water or a fire ramp to carry the water into the building. The main staircase had hose reel boxes needed to extinguish the fire but these could not be used, reported bdnews24.com. 

Also, on some floors, the boxes did not contain hose reels but were used as shelves instead, said the report.

In short, the building lacked a fire-fighting system, the investigators said.

The report made 15 recommendations to prevent such a severe blaze, emphasising the incorporation of a fire contingency plan in building designs.

Other recommendations include publishing the draft of the National Building Code to be published in a gazette, forming a government committee to fix the standards for building designers and reviewers, setting up fire hydrants 50 feet away from buildings, conducting six monthly fire safety training drills in every high-rise building and the coordination between institutions like the RAJUK and city corporations in enforcing building safety standards.