The Kingdom of Bhutan a destination for seeking spirituality and exotica and for economists to learn all about Gross Domestic Happiness, has become a testing ground for its realpolitik also. Once again it is down to a face-off between China and India in the territory of Doklam (as India calls it) or Donglang (as China calls it) situated in the tri-junction of Sikkim, China and Bhutan. Now Bhutan is grappling with rivalry between its two giant neighbours, China and India.
The stand-off began in June this year when China started building a road on the Dolan Plateau towards Indian border. The Plateau is not an Indian territory, but India thought it fit to intervene on the pretext that the Chinese-built road will give access to the so-called Chicken's Neck, a thin strip of land that connects India to its north-eastern states.
India's former Foreign Secretary Shayam Saran said that the enhanced Chinese activity is directed towards weakening India's close and privileged relationship with Bhutan, opening the door to Chinese entry and settlement of the Sino-Bhutan border, advancing Chinese security interests vis-a-vis India. He concluded that Doklam is a significant security threat to India. He on another occasion advised India's smaller neighbours to take Bhutan as a role model for conducting bilateral relations with India.
On the surface, the issue revolves around whether this 90 square-km strip of land belongs to China or Bhutan. The origin of the dispute dates back to contradictory phrases used in an agreement of 1890 between the then British Colonial India and China under the Qing dynasty. The agreement put the border in different places giving rise to claims to this strip of land by Bhutan (which India supports) and China. Now for the last two months Indian and Chinese troops squared off each other on the Doklam plateau. India claims that it intervened at the request of Bhutan to stop Chinese soldiers building a road on supposedly Bhutanese territory.
However, while asserting its claim on the disputed territory, Bhutan has been silent on whether or not it sought India's military help putting it in an uncomfortable situation. India's track record in dealing with it smaller neighbours and in particular with Bhutan lends support to the view that India took the decision unilaterally to send troops to the disputed area prompting China to accuse India of an "invasion'' aimed at further consolidating its grip over a small vulnerable neighbour. This is clearly reflected when India changed the tone from that they (Indians) were requested by "Bhutanese army" to act "in coordination with Bhutanese army''.
In reality India is threatening China from a third-country territory. This is exactly the reason China is asking India to withdraw its troops from the area. India has now set an example where China reserves its right to strike at India wherever its army is stationed in its self-defence.
China previously had proposed a settlement of the border dispute with Bhutan offering to renounce its claim over large areas in the north of the country if Bhutan relinquishes the much smaller Doklam Plateau. Bhutan considered the proposal as very attractive but India vetoed it as it would give China a strategic vantage point over India's narrow "Chicken Neck". India in its traditional fashion as a bully trampled on Bhutan's national interest one more time. Furthermore, India's action conveys the message that Bhutan still is an Indian protectorate. India's unilateral action is directed to assert its full control over Bhutan.
But India is at a much bigger game than what our eyes see at the tri-junction. It feels deeply alarmed by the rapid momentum gained by the "One Belt, One Road (OBOR)" initiative and China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean making it a decisive player across South Asia. But Hindu nationalism or Hindutva considers South Asia and the Indian Ocean as an indispensable sphere of Indian influence.
Hindutva that India espouses is a mythical India but what it inherited as 'India' is purely a colonial construct. The disjuncture between the two usually finds its concrete expression in India's domestic politics. Hindutva is a fabulation with a strong fascistic streak in it. Like white nationalism in the USA, it can cause terrible havoc in the domestic polity. Its conduct of foreign policy is equally aggressive when it comes to deal with its smaller neighbours.
The English-language Chinese newspaper, Global Times, also blames India's aggressive posturing on an upsurge of Hindu nationalist fervour. But India's extreme poverty and squalor as reflected in India's global position in such indicators as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (120), Human Development Index (133), Global Hunger Index (97), Global Health Index (143) in 2016 work against fulfilling Hindutva dream. During the same year 1.2 billion people in the world did not have access to electricity; of which India accounted for 300 million people, just one quarter of them. Despite its endeavour over the last three decades to become the leading nation in information technology, it has ended up as a nation of call centres competing with the Philippines for the business.
But India, lacking both economic and military power to face up to China by itself, joined the USA and Japan in a naval and air war exercise in Malabar in the Indian Ocean at the same time (July 10-17) when it was challenging China in Doklam. The principal sponsor of the exercise, the USA has however its own agenda and would welcome a short limited war between India and China. This will first help the US weapons industry bolster its sales to India (India is already US's second largest weapons buyer) and distract China from its OBOR initiative and the South China Sea. India is also basking in its new-found very warm relationship with the Trump administration. Japan as the principal 'client state' of the USA in the region will definitely ditto that, even may dole out some money. But that wish of the USA may remain unfulfilled because India should be knowing full well the consequences of such an adventure.
All countries in South Asia, except India, are for OBOR. India appears to be quite oblivious to the ongoing geopolitical tectonic shift in Asia and Europe. China now has emerged as the super connector in the Euroasian region; India has no role in it except joining in it if it wishes. A foreign policy guided by Hindutva is self-defeating. China is now India's one of the major trading partner and also a major investor in the country. Both countries are partners in pushing back protectionism and promoting open trade.
Though India appears to be coming up with its own alternative hotch-potch of initiatives, they have not yielded much results simply because it tried to do them on the cheap. That made India more determined to tighten its grip on smaller South Asian neighbours which are rapidly slipping out of its orbit. For India's smaller neighbours the current border conflict with China made it clearly obvious to them that India is an overbearing bullying big neighbour that seeks to control Bhutan's ability to chalk out its own actions. Now the big question is: who is the next to attract its wrath for lining up to join OBOR or the big bully itself will come to its senses and eat the humble pie and also sign up for OBOR. It has now apparently come to its senses and withdrew its soldiers from Doklam and eaten its humble pie.
The writer is an independent economic and political analyst.
